All Quiet on the Eastern Front
Richard A. Epsteint

INTRODUCTION

The title that I have chosen for this essay is something of a
contradiction in terms. There have been enormous upheavals in
Eastern Europe during the past two years. Indeed, it is unlikely
that the pace of innovation and surprise will slacken in the future,
even if its direction may change in unexpected, and even unwelcome, ways. There will be many testimonies to the enormous shifts
that have taken place there, to the fond hopes that have been realized, as in Hungary and perhaps Poland or Czechoslovakia, and to
those that have been dashed, as in Romania. If each day's events
brings us news of ferment and change, then why now of all times
would anyone have the temerity to make an ironic play on words
on Erich Maria Remarque's classic of another era, All Quiet on the
Western Front?
There are reasons for this apparent twist, stemming from the
two ways to look at the transformative events in Eastern Europe.
One way speaks of culture and transition and thrives upon local
knowledge. The other looks at the ebb and flow of events from the
loftier reaches of political and constitutional theory. Each is worth
a bit of elaboration.
The first approach concentrates on the shift from monolithic
political control to (if we are lucky when the dust settles) some
form of democratic government-a form of government that constantly probes the uncertain line between market and government
ordering. Making an accurate assessment of the way events will
play out requires an enormous amount of knowledge about specific
conditions that is clearly beyond the ken of the outsider, and in all
likelihood the insider as well. There are always questions of transition that are by nature heavily fact-specific. As the standard analysis of game theory (or at least chaos theory) so well shows, the ultimate outcome in a complete game is often highly sensitive to small
t James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of
Chicago.
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changes in initial position, the importance of which is apt to elude
both participant and observer alike.' There is therefore a sense in
which each day's news will bring anticipation and disappointment,
so that the academic analysts come to resemble (and the image is
chosen deliberately) Wall Street pundits who can speak with total
confidence about the reason why the market performed as it did
today, but are utterly at sea in trying to explain how it will respond tomorrow. 2 (I will say only that the first draft of this essay
was written six months ago, and its cautious conclusions have not
been falsified in my view by interim events.)
But what about the second approach? My only possible claim
to knowledge has less to do with the prediction of events and more
to do with the broad-gauged normative and positive analysis of the
situation. These normative and positive approaches are conceptually distinct, but they tend to blend imperceptibly in practice
and I shall not work overtime to keep them separate. The question
in its starkest form is one of political knowledge: What can we
learn from Eastern Europe and its recent history, and what can the
Eastern Europeans learn from us and our somewhat longer and
more successful historical romance with that uneasy cross between
popular democracy and constitutional government?
One ungracious response to these questions is that we can
learn nothing at all. That conclusion resonates with those who believe that history is a disconnected set of "contingent" events that
resists the application of general or covering laws. After all, if history is only a collection of episodes that follow loosely one after the
other, why should we think that our history will tell us much about
the very different tradition and culture of Eastern Europe? Indeed,
we could go one step further and ask why we should expect that
the Poles should learn from the Hungarians, or the Bulgarians
from either: if the only thing that these various nations share is a
common rejection of their communist past, there is little that
should bind them together for a common democratic future. To
the skeptic, the want of historical laws and the uniqueness of historical events defeats any effort at generalization, either of understanding or prediction.
This last argument has both strong and weak points. It seems
clear to me that there is little that we can learn from Eastern Europe. So in one sense I accept the skeptic's position. But my reason
is the exact opposite of the one the skeptic commonly advances.
1

See, for example, James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science ch 1 (Viking, 1987).

2 See Burton Gordon Malkiel, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (Norton, 1990).
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The reason that we can learn little from the events in Eastern
Europe is that the basic principles that will determine the success
or failure of a system of governance are already well known to
those who pay attention to the lessons of theory and history. The
most that Eastern Europe can tell us is that the past shows the
permanent and irremediable defects of a system of centralized control of the productive activities of a given society, whether political
or economic. The future will tell us whether the peoples of Eastern
Europe have learned that lesson or whether, because of the
problems of collective deliberation in times of crisis, each in its
own way will fritter away an opportunity that comes but infrequently to any nation. The reason we can learn very little about
first principles from the Eastern European nations is not because
their contingent circumstances are so far removed from our own.
Quite the opposite: the reason we can learn so little from them is
that the general theory of sound governance travels well abroad. If
we understand how the system works (or should be made to work)
at home, then we should understand whether it will flourish or fail
in other settings.
A short defense of my position seems appropriate. I will explore the proposition of universal first principles in the contexts of
common law adjudication and constitution-making. The development of these themes takes place at several stages, all of which
stress how a few core principles are sufficient to organize our understanding of both private and public law. Section I therefore
gives a brief account of the central and universal principles of private law-principles as applicable to business relations in Eastern
Europe as anywhere else in the world. Section II then recapitulates
in brief form the basic principles of constitutionalism, which again
are as applicable to Eastern Europe as to the democracies of Western Europe and the United States: separation of powers, federalism, and protection of individual rights (including economic liberties). Section III then explores the failure of gradualism, and notes
that there are as many hidden perils in the politics of prudence as
there are in the politics of radical change. Eastern Europe faces
three problems: the first is that of transition; the second is the
pressing need to deal with the questions of racial and ethnic divisions; and the third is its inability to forge a durable social consensus on the necessity of strong institutions of private property for
both political liberty and economic growth. Taken together, these
three points lead to a pessimistic conclusion. It will take uncommon foresight, heroic measures and massive good fortune for Eastern Europe to hit upon the constitutional measures and economic
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policies needed to overcome the devastation wrought by communist political rule and socialist economic order.
I.
A.

FIRST PRINCIPLES AND THE COMMON LAW

Common Law Rules

About ten years ago, I attacked the popular proposition that
the rules of sound common law should change with time and circumstance.' Under the standard view, the great judges are the innovators. They recognize legal obsolescence when they see it, and
then move courageously past old precedents in order to create a
body of common law rules that is more in harmony with the current times. Those judges who simply reiterate the ostensible wisdom of the past, who naively believe that law is found and not
made, are condemned to a second-class status within the legal firmament: good technicians without bold legal imagination.
In my view, this common perception seriously misconceives
the role of a great judge. To be sure, it may'take some legal imagination to apply the old rules to a novel set of circumstances. But in
this context, the genius of the judge lies not in the way he repudiates the common law rules of the past but rather how he extends
them to situations that do not fall precisely within their ambit.
For example, a judge with a powerful grasp of the rules of
trespass to land and chattels should be able to proceed by analogy
to provide protection to various forms of intangible property, noting both the similarities and differences between the new and old
situations. Thus, if there are strong rules that protect land against
trespass, and somewhat weaker rules (for example, live and let
live) that protect land against nuisance, the able judge is one who
can decide whether the trespass or the nuisance paradigm should
apply to the new situation in which the'same portion of the spectrum is covered by rival radio or television broadcasters, and resisted by ordinary landowners. The judge should be able to determine that the principle of reciprocal nuisances rests on the
proposition that all landowners are better off if each is required to
suffer the occasional intrusion from the other,4 and then extend
that principle so that the electromagnetic waves can pass freely
across property. In essence the right to receive information then
I Richard A. Epstein, The Static Conception of the Common Law, 9 J Legal Stud 253
(1980).
" See Bamford v Turnley, 3 B & S 67, 83-84, 122 Eng Rep 27, 33 (Exch 1862)
(Bramwell).
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becomes a new type of property right that is protected against various forms of interference, whether by rival broadcasters who (by
analogy to adverse possession) start to broadcast at some later
time, or against other parties whose activities jam and destroy radio signals.
The able judge will reach this conclusion because he understands the general principle that a system of private property
tends to lead to an efficient deployment of resources that works to
the long-term advantage of the public at large. The able judge also
understands that such a system will not do so when it rigorously
enforces boundary conditions, creating more bargaining and
holdout problems than it avoids. It will not do therefore to allow
any landowner to prevent any broadcaster from sending signals
over his land. Nor will it do to allow one broadcaster to silence
another because there is some reciprocal low level interference of
signal. A new set of property rights is thus superimposed on an old
one to create exclusive rights in resources that have become capable of use only with technological advance. But there is little new
in the process. The older common lawyers understood the importance of applying sound principles derived from settled cases to
novel situations. 5
The key question is why rules governing private property (by
which I include those dealing with property, contract, and tort) enjoy such great temporal durability in the common law. And the
answer is that they depend upon assumptions that hold across a
wide range of circumstances and cases. There are certain permanent features of the human condition that are not dependent on
technology or on the peculiarities of time and space, and these are
largely independent of historical accident and circumstance. It is
to these permanent features of the human condition that any
sound legal system must respond.
Two conditions come instantly to central stage. First, the scarcity of resources is a constant condition for all societies at all
times, no matter how they are organized. There is never enough to
go around, and hence the prospect of conflict and disappointment

See, for example, Pasley v Freeman, 3 T R 51, 63, 100 Eng Rep 450, 456 (KB 1789)
(Ashurst):
Where cases are new in their principle, there I admit that it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance; but where the case
is only new in the instance, and the only question is the application of a principle
recognized in the law to such new case, it will be just as competent to Courts of Justice
to apply the principle to any case which may arise two centuries hence as it was two
centuries ago ....
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is inescapable regardless of the rules that are used to determine
the production and distribution of goods. Second, the widespread,
if not universal, presence of self-interest necessarily follows. Any
individual who practices a form of voluntary and unreciprocated
altruisni will have fewer resources at his command than one who
follows the dictates of self-interest. Over time, those individuals
with a larger resource base will drive out those individuals with a
smaller base until we can expect to see the world dominated by
persons with self-interest.
On this view of the world, it makes little sense to condemn
individual conduct because it is motivated by an ample dose of
self-interest. Instead the central task is to figure out how sound
legal institutions can harness that self-interest to produce desirable
social outcomes. Both theft and trade are acts driven by self-interest, 'but they differ in that the former is always a negative sum
game (that is, one where the gains to the winner are smaller than
the losses to the loser), while exchange is a positive sum game from
which all profit.
Given the fundamental distinction between theft and exchange, any legal system must discharge three distinct tasks. The
first mission of the legal system is to determine an initial set of
property rights from which subsequent bargains can go forward at
reasonably low cost. The second mission is to insure that these entitlements once established are protected against various forms of
theft-the office of the law of crime and tort. The third mission of
the law is to facilitate the voluntary exchanges of property
rights-the law of contracts.
To return for the moment to the example of the spectrum, the
initial determination of property rights can be determined by a
principle of first user, subject to a qualification that allows (reciprocally) certain minimal levels of interference for the benefit of the
system as a whole. Thereafter actions for injunctions and damages
can be allowed to prevent the use of frequencies that have been
allocated to others. Finally, contracts can be used to assign or divide frequencies in order to promote more desirable uses. The
spectrum is a resource whose potential Aecessarily depends upon
modern technology. It is also a resource whose proper allocation
follows by analogy from the ancient and universal principles of private law.6

' See, for example, Ronald Coase, The FederalCommunications Commission, 2 J L &
Econ 1, 18 (1959), with his trenchant observation that the system of markets that he advocates might be described as "a 'novel theory' (novel with Adam Smith)." For a modern
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Starting from this view of the common law, it is easy to find
those judges whose innovation marks a clear retreat from sound
principles of legal analysis. A judge who concludes that contracts
between merchants and consumers should be invalidated because
of inequality of bargaining power may be creative, but he has made
a mistake that works mischief for the ages. 7 Under the guise of
innovation, he has substituted a view that bargains should be
treated by the same rules that govern the various forms of theft. In
other words, he replaces the model of mutual benefit through exchange with a model of exploitation through exchange. This substitution invites an unwanted exacerbation of political class conflict
by pitting management against labor, landlord against tenant,
lender against borrower, and merchant against consumer. The impulse then becomes to suppress useful bargains, thus slowing the
wheels of commerce in ways that promise little long-term systematic advantage to anyone. There is really very little about the
events of modern times that tells us whether the substitution of a
theft model for the exchange model is right or wrong. The revisionist's argument is wrong because it ignores the beneficial logic of
self-interest in trade, and it was as wrong in ancient times as it is
today. The introduction of arguments about changed social circumstances operates as a smokescreen that keeps us from larger,
more permanent conceptions that animate the basic legal system.
B.

The Universality of Common Law Principles

The rules of property, contract and tort characterize much of
our common law, but the underlying principles are by no means
confined to common law jurisdictions. Because they depend only
on a "thin" view of human nature-the twin assumptions of scarcity and self-interest-they travel well across time, space and culture. The contracts and social arrangements by the use of these
legal rules will differ, but the legal rules that best facilitate the
emergence of the strongest social order are largely invariant from
place to place.
defense of a property rights regime in the spectrum, see Jonathan W. Emord, Freedom,
Technology and the First Amendment chs 12-14 (Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, 1991).
1 See, for example, Williams v Walker Thomas FurnitureStore, 350 F2d 445, 449 (DC
Cir 1965). The source of much of this mischief is Friedrich Kessler's elegant but mistaken
article, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 Colum L
Rev 629, 640-41 (1943), which contains the implicit but misguided analogy between a capitalist firm and a fascist state during the height of World War II.
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I began my academic studies as a fledgling Roman lawyer and
have long been convinced that the myriad of differences between
the Roman and the common law are best understood as matters of
detail rather than as matters of fundamental logic. There are divisions of property, contract, and tort in both systems, and while
there are some small differences on matters of classification, or in
default rules for damages, there is very little in the legal rules of
one system that makes them inoperative in a separate legal
culture."
Japan, for example, adopted the German Code shortly after
the Germans promulgated it, 9 and there is little reason to think
that this Code did not serve the needs of commerce in a society
whose major historical attribute had been its self-enforced isolation from Western Civilization and its cultural norms. The Roman
law of sale, for example, would be perfectly serviceable in our modern environment given its absence of formalities and great flexibility-attributes that allowed it to evolve to meet the requirements
of international trade. The ostensible differences to which comparativists normally gravitate are studied for their academic difficulty and interest, not for their intrinsic importance to the overall
operation of a legal system.
The basic point about the private side of comparative law has
been made well by Saul Levmore in a series of articles about diversity and uniformity of legal rules across separate legal systems. 10
His conclusion is that uniformity arises on important questions
where the costs and benefits of a legal rule are clear. Diversity
arises on difficult and elegant points of law where the costs and
benefits are hard to trace. Levmore illustrates the basic point with
the eternal triangle of property law. A owns property which is stolen by B, who then sells the property to C who purchases the goods
in good faith, i.e., without knowledge of the defect in B's title.11
What ought to be the remedies among the three parties? One
could look far and wide across legal systems and find none that
takes the position that the thief, if found and if solvent, should be
able to keep the sale price, leaving A and C to fight over the goods.
The arguments about the destructive force of theft are, at an intui8 See Barry Nicholas, An Introduction to Roman Law 206-07, 226-27 (Oxford, 1962) for
evidence of how the common features of the Roman and common law systems, especially on
critical matters of classification, outweigh their differences.
' See Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz (Tony Weir, trans), 1 An Introduction to ComparativeLaw 360-61 (North-Holland, 1977).
10 See, for example, Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the
Good Faith Purchaser,16 J Legal Stud 43 (1987).
11 Id at 45-49.
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tive level, so powerfully felt that no legal system is prepared to
make the common thief the favorite of the law. No contingent circumstances and local variations have to be taken into account in
making this judgment.
Unfortunately, in most cases the thief (if he can be located)
does not have the proceeds of sale. The only thing that can be
done with him is to inflict some sort of punishment-be it by jail,
hard labor, torture, death-by way of deterrence against repetition
of the practice by him and by others. Yet even after that punishment is introduced, there is still the question of who should bear
the loss, A or C. There are any number of approaches to that question. One could concentrate on the location of paramount title,
which would tend to favor A, or the ability to prevent the loss,
which would tend to favor C. One could ask what either A or C
would choose if located behind the veil of ignorance;1" or ask
whether the same rule is appropriate for negotiable instruments as
is for chattels as is for agricultural products; or ask whether it
makes a difference whether C purchased in a private sale or in an
open market. The balance of convenience between all these choices
is close, for second-best questions-those that arise because A and
C cannot find the thief, B-often do not admit of decisive answers.
There may be some local variations that move a culture in this
direction or in the other, but these variations are very hard to
identify, and of little consequence to the overall efficacy of the
system.
In the end it is clear that loss-shifting rules are limited in their
potential to handle this problem, for whatever additional incentives are placed on A are necessarily removed from C and vice
versa. It is quite likely that the best solutions are those that try to
avoid the problem by making it harder for B to steal, as with a
better police force, or for C to claim the status of a bona fide purchaser, as with product identification marks or recordation that
gives notice to the world of prior possession. The difficult question
therefore is the one that generates many subtle variations, but
these variations are no greater across time and distance than they
are within a stable culture. The variation arises largely from the
difficulty of getting a dispositive answer to the question as a matter of first principle, given the thin conception of human behavior
(egotism, greed, self-interest) that all societies use to analyze the
underlying issue. No revelations derive from the comparative ap"

See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 136-42 (Harvard, 1971).
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proach that are not available to persons who bring a powerful analytical tool kit to domestic problems.
II.

FIRST PRINCIPLES AND CONSTITUTION-MAKING

This same approach-one that posits the universality of first
principles-I think applies to the far more difficult problem of constitution-making, where the problems of scarcity and self-interest
require a society to face far more epic forces than those it confronts with the eternal triangle of the common law. The basic
problem is, and always will be, as follows: a market that operates
on voluntary transactions will not be able to generate the initial set
of property entitlements on which subsequent transactions depend,
nor will it be able to enforce and protect the entitlements that are
so generated. Some uniform approach to these questions must be
developed, and it must be enshrined in a constitution or other permanent political institution. Thus, to overcome the risk of chaos,
we have to be prepared to run the risk of tyranny.
The question then arises: Is there something that can be done
to reduce that risk to acceptable levels, just as an investment in an
expensive recordation system might pay for itself by enhancing the
security of title? The basic answer to this question has to be yes.
But then the further issue arises: What are the optimal set of precautions to create the largest net gain from government (i.e., the
ability of government to provide for useful services, less the risk of
abuse)? Unfortunately, the catalogue of devices that are known for
this purpose is relatively limited, and all of them will have to be
tried in some form in Eastern Europe, just as they have been tried
in constitutions that have succeeded and failed elsewhere.
A.

Separation of Powers

The first of these devices, separation of powers, is designed to
make it more costly to achieve the minimum coalition necessary
for political action. In ordinary private transactions, any set of
rules that throws external barriers in the path of voluntary exchange is normally and properly regarded as a mistake. But in political markets the converse is true. Private parties do not have the
power to tax or to regulate strangers, so the externalities that they
create from consensual transactions (subject to an exception for
price fixing and similar arrangements) are usually positive because
they create additional opportunities for contracting to the strangers to the transaction, given the increased wealth of both A and
B. As all parties are presumptive winners, there is no case for public restriction on ordinary private market transactions.

1991]

The Eastern Front

Within the political arena, however, majorities can bind minorities, so that the transaction that produces net gains for the
members of the winning coalition may produce dramatic losses for
the outsiders. Presumably, if transaction costs were low enough
within the legislature, the outsiders might buy themselves a
charmed place in the inner circle, and thus allow political markets
to replicate the widespread gains derivable from economic markets.
But it is unreflective optimism to conclude that political markets
are capable of clearing with anything like the efficiency of competitive economic markets. The rules for separation of powers recognize the outsider's risk from exclusion and thus place greater obstacles in the path of political agreement. Separation of powers is a
highly imprecise device, and the best that we can expect is that it
will act as an imperfect filter to keep out legislation that has slender actual majorities (and hence is likely to do more external
harm), while letting through legislation that commands greater
majorities.
One should not overlook the fact that this filter has serious
limitations, however. Suppose there is a small minority that vigorously opposes some legislation, and a majority that has modest
sympathy for it. It is quite possible that the small group's skills,
influence, and tactics will not allow it to overcome the majority
even if the small group's private losses are far greater than the
gains to the other side; the political system fails to account for the
intensity of individual preferences. Indeed, dubious legislation has
passed too many times in this country under a system of separation of powers for anyone to believe that the device-however critical to the success of the overall system-will be a panacea against
all legislative evils. Separation of powers, then, is a doctrine that
gains its place not because it stops all abuse in its tracks, but because it provides some protection whose anticipated value is
greater than its cost. There is no perfection from this political device-only a chance to shorten the odds of shipwreck in the political order. Politics, like poker, is a game of edges.
B. Federalism
When the attention turns to federalism, the stakes are as high
for Eastern Europe as anywhere else. In the United States, the
problems of federalism were the problems of regionalism within a
common language and a common culture. While from time to time
these conflicts have created bitterness and local tensions-for example, the nineteenth-century issues of the tariff, or the twentieth-
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century question of the western lands-only once in our history
did these conflicts erupt into full-scale violence, and that was during the Civil War.
Eastern European nations will not be so lucky as we, for even
though their territories are far smaller than ours, the racial, linguistic, and national diversity within their tight boundaries is in
many instances far greater. Even the prospects for geographical
separation within a federation are limited because there are often
minorities nested within minorities, or widely diffused throughout
a larger population, so that short of migration any set of boundaries will leave at least some group exposed to the depredations of
its historical enemies. The United States (unlike Canada whose
federation may soon unravel over the status of Quebec) has long
had the advantage of a dominant single language that furnished
the basis for a common internal market in trade. In contrast, the
diversity and separation of the Eastern European languages will be
a barrier for both trade and governance. Within the United States,
the exact lines of the division are not that critical. It is enough to
create jurisdictions that must compete with each other for business
in a world in which exit rights are reasonably secure. But with
Eastern Europe, the choice of lines is critical, because there is reason for concern if an ethnic group spans two states within a federation, or if a state contains two equal groups. Either situation can
easily prove explosive.
The logic behind federalism posits that one of its advantages
is that it allows for a fuller satisfaction of separate tastes. 3 This is
indeed true to some extent. Take, for example, nation A, where
there are 120 people of type X and 80 of type Y. It might be possible to divide the nation into two states, one of which contains 100
of X and 20 of Y, and the other 60 of Y and 20 of X. In the first
configuration (before the division), majority choice will allow for
the satisfaction of 60 percent of the total, while federation allows
for the satisfaction of 80 percent of the total. But so long as the
separations are partial and not complete, this justification for federalism is too pat and over-optimistic.
Before the federation is in place, it could well be that each
group is able to hold off the other, perhaps because of some
supermajority provision. After the separation and federation, it is
possible that 40 people (or 20 percent of the nation's total popula13 See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism:Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U Chi
L Rev 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (review of Raoul Berger, Federalism: The Founders' Design
(Oklahoma, 1987)).
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tion) will be subject to total confiscation or denial of ordinary civil
rights. Thus, a two-thirds provision that protects against the
abridgment of fundamental rights at the national level will prove
unavailing once federalism and division have taken place.
Nor is federalism the perfect solution when the number of
groups within a nation is increased to three or more, because the
problems of local oppression and domination do not disappear simply because more groups are subject to a common federal government. All these difficulties do not suggest that federalism should
not be tried to alleviate ethnic tensions, for there is no clearly better alternative. The problem is not with constitutional strategy but
with our high expectations. The competition between governments
created by federalism exists only over certain persons and certain
activities: it affords a substantial protection to new businesses that
have a choice as to where to locate their plants. But it does not
afford protection to the owners of land, which is immovable, or to
political minorities for whom the cost of exit is, or is made by regulation, prohibitive.
In addition to these problems inherent in the federalism principle, one must consider the fact that federalism has fewer obstacles to overcome in America than in Eastern Europe. Paul Johnson
has catalogued at length the major dislocations and atrocities that
occurred when the map of Europe was redone at the conclusion of
the First World War, with the breakup of Austro-Hungary, the realignment of other borders, and the births of new nations. 4 Old
rivalries that had been kept in check within large nation-states
surged to the fore. We now risk the same difficulty in Romania
(with the Hungarian minority) and in Yugoslavia (with its eight
distinct nationalities). 5 Once separation takes place, there is no assurance that bloodshed will not follow. In the American context,
any old set of lines will do most of the time, for no matter how the
lines are contrived, South Carolina and Montana will not a have a
common border. But in Eastern Europe, the stakes regarding the
boundaries for federation, or indeed for total separation, are much
higher.
The current preoccupation in Eastern Europe is with the
problem of ethnic conflict. It is in a sense not surprising that this
issue should have displaced the transition from a planned to a
Paul Johnson, Modern Times 37-40 (Harper & Row, 1983).
See Chuck Sudetic, With Yugoslavia in Turmoil, Macedonia Holds First Free Election, NY Times 16 (intl ed, Nov 11, 1990). With at least eight separate regions, there appears to be no reason why Yugoslavia should be kept a single nation.
14

15

The University of Chicago Law Review

[58:555

market economy as the central stumbling block in the making of
Eastern European constitutions. The control of state monopolies
has to take a back seat to the prevention of potential bloodshed.
C.

Constitutional Protections of Individual Rights

So we come to the last of our possibilities, the protection of
individual rights under a constitution, including those of speech,
property, and religious freedom. The logic of a system of liberty is
that collective decisions are difficult to make, and often unnecessary. Whether we eat pizza or tacos for lunch should not be decided by committee vote. Each citizen can make his own choice.
Better it is therefore for the state to carve out many separate domains in which single persons have full power of choice than it is
for the state to create larger domains in which many persons share
the decisionmaking power under some voting rule. I think that it is
inconceivable that we should want religious beliefs and practices to
be chosen by collective decision. While there is today widespread
acceptance of the vital role of freedom of choice, and the importance of self-realization in connection with intimate personal associations, I see no reason why the same logic should not apply to
associational preferences that apply in all domains, including the
economic. There are probably as many people who achieve selfrealization (as they define it) through work as through marriage,
and the state should not take it upon itself to decide which forms
of association are worthy of respect and which are not.
The principle of limited government should be of special usefulness in Eastern Europe where the divisions between people are
so deep that any collective decision is likely to leave a sorely aggrieved minority. The animosities of centuries are not likely to disappear with a few days or weeks of earnest constitutional conversation. It is far better therefore to promote a regime of individual
liberty and freedom of association, so as to avoid the dangers associated with extensive forced interactions. So long as government
power is used to keep people apart until they choose to come together, there is a greater chance that people of fundamentally different preferences can live together under a single government
than there is if the state is given extensive powers to bind, regulate, tax, and coerce by collective decision. Indeed the greater the
internal disparity, the more critical it is to have a small list of core
government functions on whose discharge all can agree. As geographical federation has only limited use in the Eastern European
checkerboard, small government at all levels allows economic and
social separation to mitigate ethnic conflict when geographical sep-
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aration is not possible. Eastern Europe will prosper from a strong
dose of freedom of contract and association. It should be especially
wary of employment discrimination laws.
Still I am not sanguine about the prospects of a system of liberty. There are too many people who will wish to settle old scores
by whatever means that are available to them. There are too many
people who believe that they are clever enough to rig a system that
makes their own lofty visions of the just society politically obtaina-.
ble. Most critically perhaps, working out the system of constitutional liberties, as our own history has shown, is far more complicated than the brief thumbnail sketch given above suggests.
All constitutional liberties start life as absolutes. They end
life, however, as the first stage in a balancing process-a process
that gives no clear guidance as to what exceptions should be allowed, what qualifications should be heaped upon the exceptions,
what burdens of proof should be assigned, and who should decide
whether the rights have been abridged or respected. In our own
tradition, we have embraced a problematic distinction between
preferred freedoms (speech, and until recently, religion 6 ) and ordinary economic liberties, where very low standards of justification
are now required to legitimate state action. A system of protected
liberties is far from self-defining and self-enforcing, and we have
made, in my view, serious mistakes in relaxing the constitutional
guarantees for economic liberties and property rights. Today, mere
regulation passes constitutional muster, even though its broad application means that it often will have major adverse consequences.
The police power covers just about any interest that one could divine, including protecting individuals from the consequences of
their own voluntary contracts. We have been able to survive this
set of constitutional blunders because our political infrastructure,
although flawed, still manages to impose some restraints on government action. But the costs to domestic prosperity have been
high nonetheless.
Within the context of Eastern Europe, property and economic
protections are critical to the ability to turn nations and economies
around from central planning to private ordering. The key elements are stability and permanence of the property rights structure. There is surely a general belief in most Eastern European
countries that selling off nationalized businesses is the first step in
16 See Employment Division v Smith, 110 S Ct 1595 (1990), and Michael W. McConnell's critique, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U Chi L Rev 1109
(1990).
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an orderly progression to a viable market economy. But while there
is consensus today on denationalization of industry, there is little
consensus on the steps that will-and ought-to follow these sales.
Most concretely, the Eastern European countries, preoccupied as
they are with the status of ethnic divisions and minorities, have
failed to make state regulation of economic affairs subject to any
form of constitutional discipline.
Given the strong socialist tradition that lurks within the interstices of the older communist order, one cannot expect the public
(through its legislatures and its courts) to conduct a radical transformation of society and to embrace ardently an intelligent system
of laissez-faire capitalism. Quite the opposite is more likely. There
will be the predictable calls for prudence across-the-board; a waitand-see attitude will take hold with respect to the general economic reform that follows the initial prioritization. And that call
could be fatal to any systematic improvements in social well-being.
III. THE FAILURE OF GRADUALISM
A.

The Time Element

In dealing with the questions of privatization, it is important
to be aware not only of the perils of rash actions, but of the perils
of prudence as well. The attempt to run a political "experiment"
with market institutions may be the very decision that defeats the
successful transition to markets in the first place.
One critical element in understanding the operation of markets concerns the time horizons under which they operate. If X is
thinking of starting a business, the first question she will have to
ask is whether she will be able to recoup in the future the frontend investment that she is required to make today. Where businesses require an extensive commitment of time and labor, the period over which the recoupment could take place can be quite long,
perhaps several years, or even a decade or more. The owner is prepared to wait a longer period of time before recouping her original
costs when the legal environment is stable, when the regulatory
structure is predictable, and when the tax burdens are ascertainable. When American companies invest in unstable countries, typically they will only look at investments that pay their way in three
years or less; when they go to established Western Europe economies, they will take a very different view of the time horizon, accepting a lower per-period rate of return because they are confident that there will be a larger number of periods over which the
investment can be recovered.
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So what is the situation in Eastern Europe? Without the
strongest possible constitutional guarantees of property rights, and
perhaps even with them, potential investors will have to take a
short-term view of their investment prospects. They will choose
only those projects that yield very high short-term returns. The
adoption of that point of view will then lead the Eastern Europeans to regard the investors as mere speculators. Popular resentment will grow because of the excessive returns that capitalism
promises the few at the expense of the many. There will be a
strong demand for leveling and for countermeasures, and these will
paradoxically be seen to have justified the original decision to hold
off on investment unless extraordinary returns are promised.
If the environment were otherwise, investors would undertake
more projects, some promising lower rates of return. Economic activity will do better precisely because the political institutions of
the state have crossed their Rubicon by giving permanent constitutional protection to property rights. There will be fewer cases of
extravagant return and broader participation in the overall market.
Thus the very effort to constrain the nature of the market experiment to a limited period of time distorts the results that the experiment itself now yields, and guarantees its failure. The effort to
temporize on the shift to markets increases the likelihood of
failure.
B.

The Atmosphere of Crisis

A related phenomenon that may doom private ordering in
Eastern Europe has to do with the fact that those nations now face
a crisis of monumental proportions. When matters are truly desperate, it may be possible to forge a coalition that will take radical
steps to avoid a wholly untenable situation. If markets are thought
to increase the levels of overall production, people could be persuaded to put aside their fascination with regulation and redistribution in order to survive. But once the situation improves-once
the people begin to take stock in the changes that have occurred-there will be a tendency for some people to argue for the
short-term distributional gain over the long-term productive one.
No set of legal institutions can prevent this squabbling from
happening. However, an awareness of the risk may encourage the
nations to go "cold turkey." Indeed, an attitude of "there's no going back" drastically improves the chances of success. The situation in Eastern Europe is so desperate in so many nations that all
the eggs have to be put in one basket.
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Monetary Policy

There is an additional element to this theme that bears some
notice as well. It is not enough to have a stable system of property
rights unless there is also a stable currency, a task that is peculiarly difficult to discharge for governments under. siege. Again,
there is a good deal that can be learned from the American experience. During the Great Depression, when the currency was allowed
to deflate by some 30 percent, the shifts that took place did more
than simply change the relationship between money and goods. It
was not as though everyone had fewer dollars but their economic
net worth in real terms remained the same. Instead, the deflation
worked a substantial redistribution of wealth between debtors and
creditors in ways that prompted massive social dislocations.
A simple case illustrates the general theme. Suppose that a
bank lends a farmer $1,000 to be repaid in five years. If the value
of the currency is deflated by 50 percent, then the $1,000 owed
becomes in real terms a debt of $2,000, the additional burden of
which may spell ruin for the farmer, even as it creates a windfall to
the bank. But even that windfall may prove to be a mixed blessing
if the bank has borrowed from some other party. When its farmerdebtor defaults, the entire structure can fall like a row of dominoes. The instability here is in fact no different from that which
would occur if the state simply announced that the farmer owed
the bank an additional $1,000.
What is true of a lending arrangement is also true of every
other form of private contract, including those for the sale of land
and goods. If it is thought to be unpardonable government action
to change the quantity term of a contract, then so too is it an unpardonable error to change the price term. What holds for deflation holds for inflation as well. The point here is an old one, but it
bears retelling in this context, given that the temptation to inflate
a currency to reduce government debt will be strong for all countries in the Eastern bloc, just as it is in the United States. A stable
system of property rights and a strong system of contractual enforcement counts for little if the state currency is subject to political manipulation. At the very least all local currencies should be
freely convertible in world markets. Otherwise there is no effective,
anonymous and impartial check against political tampering with
the currency, and there is no way to induce foreign capital to come
into a country from which it cannot at some future time freely exit.
The creation, therefore, of a system of property rights does not depend solely upon adopting a sound set of rules of property, con-
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tracts and torts. It depends on a set of sound public institutions as
well.
CONCLUSION

This somber assessment of prospects thus returns us to my
original theme, All Quiet on the Eastern Front. In essence, I think
that it is possible to give this assessment based on only the most
general features of political life. The material about separation of
powers, federalism, and vested rights all depend on the kinds of
facts with which we are all familiar. The concerns with faction,
self-interest, and ethnic and national rivalries are hardly the stuff
of great originality. But because the transitional problems are so
intractable, it is possible to maintain this paradox: what will happen in Eastern Europe will amaze, astound, and largely disappoint.
And these troubled results follow inexorably from general political
principles that are-or at least should be-familiar to all students
of constitutional government.

